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Abstract
What work is entailed in learning skills? How do processes of enskillment enable alternative ways 
of seeing, feeling and acting? How can we intersubjectively meet each other when deception is 
regarded as prevalent? This article addresses these questions through recounting my experiences 
associated with learning entertainment magic. I outline how the training of competencies can 
involve an ongoing problematising of the relationship between seeing and knowing as well as 
between knowledge and ignorance. Furthermore, through recounting the affirmations and 
disorientations of my process of learning, I want to consider how skills acquisition can serve as a 
method for self-other investigation.
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Across varied qualitative traditions, self-studies of acquiring practical knowledge and 
embodied skills have elaborated how the honing of cognitive and bodily capabilities 
enables ways of seeing, feeling and acting (e.g., Sudnow, 1978; Tolmie and Rouncefield, 
2013). And yet, accompanying such analyses have been methodological challenges; for 
example, whether and how one individual pathway of skilling can speak for many (e.g., 
O’Conner 2005; Atkinson 2013).
This article examines my attempts to learn entertainment magic in order to ask: ‘What 
kind of work is associated with magic as a domain of reasoning and skill?’
Towards this end, the next four sections offer vignettes recounting selected embodied 
and materially situated forms of competency training in my first year of study of card 
magic. In recognition of the manner in which qualitative research invariably fuses plan-
ning and discovery (Reybold et al., 2012: 700), these sections outline the 
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unfolding questions, uncertainties and reconsiderations that emerged through attending to 
the starting research concern with forms of work.  A recurring theme will be how, again 
and again, my enskilling involved attempts to know others and myself.  In this regard, 
while magic was the topic for investigation, the practice of magic itself served as a method 
– a method of turning toward self and other. As will be elaborated, though, this turning 
toward was not straightforward, not least because of the manner learning entailed both 
closely attending to, and coming to doubt, sensory experiences.
Drawing on traditions within hermeneutics, section 6 sets out how I came to concep-
tualise my exploration of self and other. In the final section I use the sensitivities culti-
vated to explore the relevance of this specific line of research for qualitative research 
more widely as it pertains to: (i) how skill learning can entail an ongoing problematising 
of the relationship between what counts as ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’; (ii) how knowledge 
ignorance as well as the ability and inability to know can be constitutive of learning; and 
(iii) the stakes and relevancies of intersubjectivity in deceptively engaging with others.
Textual instructions
‘No-clue discovery’
A spectator chooses a card and returns it to the deck. He then cuts the deck and completes the 
cut. His card is lost in the pack and no one – not even the magician – knows where the card is.
The magician takes the deck and begins dealing cards one at a time into the face-up heap on the 
table. As the magician deals, he instructs the spectator to call out the names of the cards. The 
spectator is asked to give no clue when his selected card shows up. He is not to pause, hesitate, 
blink or change his facial expression. Nevertheless, the magician claims, he will be able to 
detect the faintest change in the spectator’s tone of voice at the exact instant the chosen card 
shows up.
The cards are dealt one at a time off the top of the deck. The spectator calls them out as they as 
are dealt. It does not matter how he calls them out; he can disguise his voice, whisper, shout or 
name the cards in French; when the chosen card turns up, the magician immediately announces 
that it is the card selected by the spectator. (Fulves, 1976: 1–2)
Where to begin though? The question has particular significance in relation to learning 
‘entertainment magic’ (or what is otherwise called ‘modern conjuring’) because of the 
comparative absence of conventional pathways for training. Whereas many other types 
of performance are enculturated through professionally sanctioned training as part of 
established organisational settings (schools, studios, etc.), both are relatively rare in the 
case of magic. Clubs and societies provide important collective settings for socialising 
skills and competencies (Jones, 2011), but their availability and make-up vary widely. In 
short, informal avenues for training are typical (e.g., Rissanen et al., 2014).
A phased approach to learning was adopted in this self-study in order to enable a 
comparison between the forms of work associated with each type of training. While, at 
the time of writing, I have undertaken face-to-face masterclass training and given face-
to-face and virtual public shows, this article attends to forms of training undertaken in 
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my first year. This includes learning through books, videos, mirror practice and small 
group performance sessions with acquaintances. 
In the past, instructional books have been a common means of enabling new entrants 
into community traditions, while also delimiting the circulation of secreted information. 
As part of its extensive magic collection, Dover Publications printed eleven ‘self-work-
ing magic’ books by the prolific writer Karl Fulves. Based on a suggestion from the 
academic-magician Wally Smith, in late 2017, my pathway began with Fulves’ books. 
Published in 1976, Self-Working Card Tricks: 72 Foolproof Card Miracles for the 
Amateur Magician initiated this Dover series. The first instruction is for ‘No-clue dis-
covery’, and the quote above provides the opening paragraphs setting out the trick’s 
intended effects.
How to approach the following of such instructions? While no definition of ‘self-
working’ is given within the book, Fulves (1976: v) describes the tricks set out as ‘easy 
to master’ because they require ‘no skill’. Based on well-established themes in social 
research regarding the incompleteness of instructions (e.g., Livingston, 2008), however, 
my starting approach was that of attending to the gross and subtle forms of work needed 
to move from the formal, codified prescriptions to situated action.
What then was the work of following instructions of Self-Working Card Tricks? In this 
article, I attend to self-other dynamics. As with many tricks, envisioning was a central 
basis for aligning with the instructions of ‘No-clue discovery’. Against my own perspec-
tive, I repeatedly imagined what others would see and hear. As I fancied at the time any-
way (see section 5), this amounted to something akin to watching a video filmed from 
across the table. As such, my own ways of observing, reflecting and acting were taken as 
the analog model for attributing how others would think and act. Within philosophy of 
mind, the term ‘simulation’ refers to how we intersubjectively know the minds of others 
by emulating and ascribing mental states through such reasoning (Goldman, 2002).
For instance, as part of describing the mechanisms for identifying the card, ‘No-clue 
discovery’ states:
Tell the spectator to replace his card on top of the packet that lies on the table. Your instructions 
should be something like this: ‘Please place your card back in its original position in the 
deck.’ As you speak, point with the right hand to the tabled packet. As a matter of fact, the 
spectator is not returning his card to its original location, but this fact is never questioned. 
(Fulves, 1976: 2–3)
In this, the ‘No-clue discovery’ instructions set out a minimal sense of intersubjectivity: 
individuals interact and coordinate actions with one another as part of a shared activity. 
Many meanings given to ‘intersubjectivity’ across the social sciences and humanities, 
however, would not be applicable to this scenario. It would be questionable to character-
ise the instructions as involving shared (or even similar) mental states (Zlatev et al., 
2008) or experiences (Brinck, 2008). In general, magic is predicated on the possibility of 
fostering fundamentally dissimilar states between performers and audiences.1 This is 
recognised in popular portrayals of magic, which treat it as entailing deception. Magicians 
might proffer all sorts of verbal and non-verbal explanations for their feats, but audiences 
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appreciate that these can function as techniques of ruse. Magicians, in turn, craft their 
routines in light of such anticipations.
Along these lines, when enacting the instructions in Self-Working Card Tricks, I imag-
ined how the sequence of steps would be seen and interpreted by onlookers by trying to 
see myself through their scrutinising eyes. In the case of the quote above, such envision-
ing led me to doubt that no one would ever question the ‘Please place your card back in 
its original position in the deck’ directive. In keeping with the way skill cultivation entails 
both centripetal discipline to, and centrifugal derivation from, community stipulations 
(Downey et al., 2015), working through the instructions in Self-Working Card Tricks fre-
quently elicited in me a concern for the kinds of actions not anticipated, and therefore the 
need for situated adjustments. Thus, at times, while the instructions provided the core 
basis for my simulations, the simulations provided the terms for assessing the adequacy of 
the specifics of the instructions.
Missing from the accounts of spectators by Fulves then is what seems central to the 
undertaking of tricks: the lived interactions between people. This is not just to say that 
the instructions are no substitute for hands-on experience. It is also to point out that 
instructions don’t identify or contain all the resources needed for navigating the step-by-
step undertaking of tricks. As Gallagher (2001) has contended, we rarely intersubjec-
tively know others only through postulating or imagining mental states. Instead, 
interactions are typically characterised by a rich diversity of ongoing signalling that 
helps individuals to directly understand each other. Eye movements, facial expressions, 
posture, displays of emotions and the like make attempts at ‘mind-reading’ more like 
‘body-reading’. These are the kinds of expressive contingencies that I began to appreci-
ate were not present in the instructions in Self-Working Card Tricks.
Instructional videos
While in the past instructional books served as an essential resource for many aspiring 
magicians, today a vast range of audiovisual instructions are available through DVDs 
and on-line. Videos can display a complex array of (simultaneous) bodily movements 
that would each require lengthy individual descriptions involving specialised terminol-
ogy if codified into writing. My engagement with audiovisual instructions began in the 
late spring of 2018 as part of learning ‘sleight of hand’ manipulations through the video 
edition of the classic instructional book called The Royal Road to Card Magic (Hugard 
and Braue, 2015). Subsequently this self-training was complemented by watching video 
instructions of the sleights and tricks given in The Royal Road to Card Magic produced 
by others on YouTube.
In relation to the self-other themes of this article, I want to attend to the varied visual 
(re-) positioning associated with audiovisual instructions. Similar to the opening para-
graphs of ‘No-clue discovery’, a common organisation of audiovisual aids is that they 
start with an enactment of the trick in question without divulging its mechanisms, and 
then proceed to offer step-by-step instructions. Whereas reading texts requires imagining 
what viewers will experience, videos enable learners to perceive and affectively experi-
ence tricks as an audience.
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And yet, as with other forms of witnessing (e.g., Shapin, 1984), through my learning 
I came to understand audiovisual displays as far more complicated too. What training 
videos provide is not a demonstration that component sleights or culminating tricks can 
be done in general, but a demonstration that they have been executed in specific situa-
tions. The flipside of this specificity is that witnessing one enactment is no guarantee it 
can be executed elsewhere.
The camera angle is an obvious consideration bearing on whether an effect experi-
enced as a viewer can be achieved as a performer. This matter is especially acute given the 
commonplace practice in on-line magic tutorials to offer performances solely for the eye 
of camera and its specific angling. I came to appreciate this dependency when practicing 
the trick ‘Topsy-Turvy’, the first in The Royal Road to Card Magic (Hugard and Braue, 
2015) and one that figured in my second sleight-based card session (see below). Despite 
watching video after video, when practicing in front of a mirror, I just could not perform 
the critical turn in this trick without prominently ‘flashing’ a card. Only after varied 
attempts to adjust my hand actions over the course of a number of days did I realise that 
the issue was that my mirror was closer than the camera in any of the videos. I took a 
couple of small steps backward and the overturn seemed nearly undetectable.
Additional complications arise in making sense of what is shown through reference to 
what is not. For instance, multiple filming takes can be required to achieve a displayed 
effect, but instructors rarely acknowledge this. As a result, what an instructor can dem-
onstrate through a one-off filming is not necessarily easy for anyone else (including the 
instructor) to duplicate. Indeed, learning through watching and replicating others made 
me more sensitive to the varied potential deficiencies of live performances. As a result, 
the observable perfection of any one tutorial stood as grounds for doubting that I could 
consistently replicate what was demonstrated.
The points in the last few paragraphs touch on wider cultural investments (Morris, 
2014). Visual recordings – such as photographs and videos – are often regarded with a 
kind of doubleness. The common expression ‘seeing is believing’ signals the stock placed 
in visual recordings as true chronicles. And yet, as records, such visual images are also 
recognised as not the same thing as the events they seek to capture. By giving a particular 
line of sight or by foregrounding some objects, visual imaginary can mislead. Also, what 
is included within the image frame marks the boundaries of what has been left out – inten-
tionally or otherwise. It is just this sort of doubleness – genuine and contrived –that tricks 
play upon, and indeed, require. As a result, for me instructional videos have taken on a 
kind of ‘haunted’ quality: their efforts to display point towards what is not shown; their 
efforts to visibly exhibit point towards the irrevocable role of trust in viewing.
Mirror practice
Practicing with a mirror is a common technique when learning magic and, as noted 
above, it was one that I utilised in practicing sleights. The advantages of this technique, 
compared to imagining how you appear, can be pronounced. For instance, undertaking 
sleights can be a fiddly operation, with the thumb and fingers being varyingly maneu-
vered. When this kind of fiddling occurs, it seems that the card manipulation should be 
blatant to onlookers. Practicing in front of a mirror visually confirms the considerable 
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scope for occulted maneuvering that can be afforded, for instance, by slightly angling the 
deck. Although I have practiced individual sleights hundreds of times, again and again, I 
still feel compelled to do so in front of a mirror to confirm the card handling is not gener-
ally detectable.
In this respect then, mirror practice brings together the possibility of perceiving your-
self as another person would, with the underlying knowledge and experiences of a magi-
cian. Herein, the mirror functions as a relational device along the lines it has within 
certain strains of conceptualising self-other relations. Jacques Lacan (1977), for instance, 
famously claimed specular images secure self-fantasies: against internal tumultuous 
bodily drives and fragmentary thoughts, one’s mirror image serves as an aspirational 
representation of a stable, whole and coherent self. In certain respects, practicing magic 
entails a kind of identification with one’s mirror image. Whatever one’s fraught affective 
and physical states, as a representation of self that is observable to others, the mirror 
image serves as a touchstone for gauging proficiency.
Or at least in certain respects it does. My very need to revisit sleights in front of a 
mirror, for instance, signals the lack of definitiveness of specular self-witnessing. One 
limitation is that the seeing done during mirror practice is the situated seeing of one who 
knows what to look for. Yet, audiences may not perceive or give significance to what 
might be glaringly obvious to a performer. Indeed, as magicians often (but not always) 
strive to not bring attention to card manipulations in the first place, what might be at the 
centre of concern for a magician looking in the mirror may not be meant to be relevant 
to audiences at all (cf. Lynch, 2013). Conversely, though, while audiences might not 
apprehend card sleights, a common refrain in professional advice is they can be highly 
perceptive in sensing certain kinds of subtleties – such as when conjurers unconsciously 






















Mary: . . .other than doing what we are told, I think we are pretty  
 passive players in the magic.
BR: Hum, hum. One of the things I am interested in is attention and  
 the way attention kind of gets negotiated in these sort of settings.  
 So did you bring up attention before, right?
Mary: Hmm.
BR: Okay, so, I could be going through the deck like this or something 
 like that and you might be at times really focused, okay. Other  
 times maybe looking around, right?
Mary: Hmm.
BR: It has been interesting for me because this is the first time I have  
 done these tricks in this way. But I did have people around before  
 [and] there are two extremes. One extreme, was this guy, on his  
 mobile phone for most of the evening going like this.
Mary: That’s really edifying.
Mary and BR: [laughter]
[. . .]
BR: And then the other extreme was when I was doing these and  
 someone said, oh Brian, I am watching you and the cards and I am  
 watching. And then she kind of leans in like this. OK, she did not 
 watch the whole night, obviously, but you know for quite a bit of it 
BR picks up deck
BR spreads the deck
BR leans in
BR leans back, starts 
and finishes a card  
sleight
BR pretends to be  
using a mobile phone 





As a response to both sets of considerations, many instructions advise learners not to 
get preoccupied with making sleights visually perfect, but instead to engage with audi-
ences and thereby produce a relaxed atmosphere in order to disarm their scrutiny.2 In this 
way, learning through mirror practicing entails a delicate process of seeking to refine 
techniques through greater visual discrimination, while also attending to whether and 
how seeing is relevant.
Performing
By considering the kinds of work entailed in learning skills, the previous three sections 
recounted varied forms of practice wherein notions of others were simulated, imagined 
or likewise conjured up. This section recounts experiences associated with putting on 
card performances in order to set the stage for further reflections on the relation between 
enskilling, seeing and being.
As part of such performances I conducted a set of 13 recorded sessions consisting of 
nine tricks derived from Self-Working Card Tricks in the first half of 2018 and a set of 10 
recorded sessions in the second half of the year consisting of nine ‘sleight of hand’ tricks 
largely derived from The Royal Road to Card Magic. The background and rationale for 
those sessions have been elaborated elsewhere (Rappert forthcoming).3 For the purpose 
of the present argument, however, the sessions were run in the mode of small focus 
groups, combining tricks with interspersed pre-formulated questions for group discus-
sion. The 55 different participants were largely university staff in the UK and Sweden.4
One of the upshots I took from these performances in relation to self-other dynamics 
was the importance of questioning the prevalent tendency in academic and practitioner 
writing to theorise magic as a competitive, controlling and hierarchical activity (Rappert 
forthcoming). Although the encounters in the sessions entailed various forms of asym-



















 she was just like this.
George: I’m watching you pretty hard actually.
BR: Okay [. . .] but you are not totally watching me. You are talking  
 to Mary or Emma.
George: I’m watching you pretty hard actually.
Mary, Emma and BR: [laughter]
BR: You are watching me pretty hard. I can feel the heat coming out.
Mary, Emma and BR: [laughter]
Mary: That’s mildly threatening [. . .] George has slight paranoid  
 tendencies.
George: I am always interested in looking for the angles on things and 
 I really dislike being a mug.
Mary and Emma: [laughter]
George: And I have a slightly flawed relationship to this sort of thing.  
 Because it plays into that a little bit.
Emma: Well you are not the first one I can tell you. We have seen this  
 reaction as well from a couple of people.
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noticeable for me were forms of reciprocity. For instance, as recounted in the exchange 
above, I needed participants to scrutinise me; without their active attention and challeng-
ing, there would not have been anything revealed/concealed. And yet, if taken too far, 
such regard would have made the tricks nearly impossible to pull off. In general, partici-
pants verbally (and often playfully) sanctioned each other (or themselves) when a line of 
action was deemed to have been taken too far (e.g., the reproach in lines 30–31 above) or 
not far enough (e.g., a participant was judged as not paying sufficient attention). As 
another area of tension, instead of understanding themselves as simply passive spectators 
seeking to discern how I performed the tricks, participants frequently presented them-
selves as deliberately engaged in co-operative relations in which they made choices about 
how to act vis-à-vis their situationally expectations. And yet, as suggested by lines 1–2 of 
the exchange above, they overwhelmingly forwarded such accounts only after being 
explicitly prompted by me to consider how they were contributing to the unfolding scene.
For the purposes of the present argument, however, I want to limit regard to how ‘see-
ing’ figured in the unfolding self-other interactions. Although the self-working tricks in 
the first 13 sessions did not require sophisticated card sleights, one of the nine did neces-
sitate pushing a card out of the deck to glimpse it and another entailed covertly turning 
over a deck. On some occasions too, when the cards got out of the required order, I 
needed to rearrange them there and then at the table. Almost all of the nine tricks in the 
second set involved one or more physical sleights – false shuffles, lifting multiple cards, 
forcing participants to select a predetermined card, etc. My expectation was that such 
manipulations would be frequently detectable, not least because of my novice status. 
And yet, rarely did participants forward (accurate) identifications – either when asked 
directly by me initially or in the numerous occasions in which they offered unprompted 
explanations. This was so even when, as in the exchange above, individuals reported 
watching me ‘pretty hard’. While what counts as verbally identifying a card manipula-
tion is open to interpretation, I would put the number of such specific occasions across 
all of the sessions somewhere in the high single digits.
The limits of perceptions serve as one possible set of explanations for such an out-
come. Fields of science have long sought to explain why sleights and other forms of 
trickery prove so hard to detect – including to magicians themselves (Lamont, 2006). In 
recent years, renewed interest under the label the ‘science of magic’ has emerged that 
utilises tricks as experimental stimuli for studying visual perception and cognitive heu-
ristics (Kuhn et al., 2016; Kuhn, 2019). One review summed up the principles identified 
through this latest phase of research as:
First, some things, though directly in a person’s line of sight, are not perceptible at all. Second, 
people do not consciously perceive everything that can be perceived. Third, what is consciously 
perceived depends upon attention. Individuals will fail to see even what is in their direct line of 
sight or fail to feel an easily perceptible touch if their attention is elsewhere. Fourth, people 
sometimes misinterpret what they perceive. Fifth, individuals’ memories fail in ways that 
permit changes to occur before their eyes that they do not consciously perceive. Sixth, these 
failures can be regularly and lawfully produced by specific manipulations of individuals’ 
perceptual and sensory systems (Villalobos et al., 2014: 637).
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In short, what is observable depends on the means of observing. Among philosophers 
and psychologists, much debate has taken place about what this emerging understanding 
of the fallibility of cognition and perception implies for the nature of consciousness and 
the ultimate truth status of visual perceptions (e.g., Noë, 2002).
Settling such disputes is not the agenda here. Instead I want to juxtapose these argu-
ments about the limits of perception against the discursive work prevalent in the sessions 
that defined the experiential situation at hand. In his classic study, Pollner (1987: xv) 
identified ‘mundane reasoning’ as a ubiquitous form of constructing the world wherein 
individuals ‘experience and describe themselves as “reacting to” or “reflecting” an 
essentially objective domain or world’. Within the traffic court proceedings he exam-
ined, for instance, witnesses to an incident could offer radically divergent accounts. 
Judges seeking to adjudicate ‘what happened’ were thus in a position of striving to deter-
mine the facts of a world taken to exist independently of how it was observed, while also 
necessarily being reliant on this and that situated observation. Pollner detailed how 
divergent accounts of witnesses got reconciled in ways that judges could both determine 
the ‘facts of the matter’ and preserve the starting presumption that there was an essen-
tially out-there, ordinary and objective world to be found that could be taken to exist 
independently of knowers.
In a similar vein, participants in my sessions did not consider that what is observable 
depends on the means of observing. While they repeatedly acknowledged that sight can 
be directed away from the cards, only once was the suggestion made that perception was 
significantly fallible.5 Neither were more general claims offered that what was observa-
ble significantly depended on the means of observing or reporting. In brief, participants 
accounted for the unfolding scene through a realistic language according to which the 
familiar world is out there and our senses deliver it to consciousness.
Instead of calling into question the determinacy of perception, participants to both the 
self-working and sleight-based sessions offered stock explanations echoing popular 
understandings of the mechanisms of magic – explanations overwhelmingly inaccurate 
to the tricks at hand or, at best, referring to highly general principles. Some of these 
explanations included physical sleight dexterity, cards being placed up sleeves, and hid-
den mirrors. Participants also frequently sought to identify tell-tale indicators in the per-
formance that signalled the hidden mechanics. Again, the identified indicators often 
proved extraneous or irrelevant.
While participants sought to determine the ‘facts of the matter’ in a manner that pre-
served the possibility for an essentially ‘out-there’ world, as part of my self-reflections I 
began to notice I was doing the same. It is perhaps not surprising that in practicing 
(avowed) deception, a preoccupation that repeatedly came to the fore in my mind was 
this: might participants be deceiving me? Might they have spotted (potential) give-away 
signs and just decided that they should pass without comment in the name of cooperation 
or avoiding embarrassment? This would align with the contention of many social theo-
rists that tact and flexibility with the truth are part of the fabric of everyday interactions 
(Miller, 2003). So too it would align with seasoned professional magicians’ recognition 
of the potential (and, indeed, likelihood) for audience accommodation (e.g., Brown, 
2003). Therefore I could hardly rule such deception out, whatever I heard. But I could 
not definitely discern it either.
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As part of my learning, doubts about what was perceived and the potential of decep-
tion did not just apply to others. As noted in section 2, part of my initial efforts in devel-
oping skills entailed envisioning what others would see when observing me. What I 
convinced myself of at the time of practicing with written instructions was that my simu-
lations of others’ experiences amounted to a rolling video with all parts in focus. The 
hesitations raised through my performance sessions about what participants saw, how-
ever, prompted me to reconsider my previous experiences. When I tried to reconstruct 
what I had been imagining during my training, what got summoned up was a recollection 
of hazy, fragmented and fleeting imagery. Somethings came in view – part of my shirt, 
the side of my hand, etc. – but there was nothing like a ‘picture frame’ image in my mind. 
Even if I try to simply imagine what I look like from across my desk right at this very 
moment, I cannot generate anything like a typical perceptual experience of watching the 
television. Try it. In short, in being prompted to look back after conducting some perfor-
mances, I didn’t envision what I thought I had imagined while practicing with Self-
Working Card Tricks. Not only then did I come to question whether my experiences 
could serve as analog simulation model for others, I also came to question whether my 
experiences were anything like I had previously understood them. Akin to a skilful dis-
play of magic, the effect was befuddling and exhilarating in similar measure.
Strange learning
Entertainment magic often matters for the way it affectively and cognitively stirs us. 
‘How was that done?’ is a common response to the inexplicable. Learning magic dispels 
much of the allure of conjuring, not least through the sheer grind of repetitive practice. 
And yet, as I have elaborated, while the initial wonder and mysteries of magic faded, in 
my learning another sense of curiosity emerged regarding what we might gloss as the 
‘situated accomplishment of intersubjectivity’.
One pragmatic response to the kinds of hesitation about experience outlined in previ-
ous sections is to simply set them aside in favour of focusing on ‘what works’. Much of 
the instructional material for magic is concerned with just that: imparting learners with 
sufficient skills that enable them to satisfactorily undertake tricks. If we embrace rather 
than set aside the troubles of knowing self and other, however, what possibilities might 
open up?
The question of how a process of skill acquisition could serve as a means of investi-
gating notions of self and other became central to my learning. The manner I eventually 
came to engage with these troubles was by theorizing conjuring through the umbrella 
notions of the ‘familiar’ and the ‘strange’. In Truth and Method, Gadamer attended to 
ways of being that brought a sense of affirmation and belonging as well as disorientation 
and distance (see Kerdeman, 1998). Much of day-to-day life consists of participating in 
activities that are rendered familiar through our established preconceptions and conven-
tions. Gadamer, however, was also attentive to disruptive experiences in face-to-face 
dialogues, reading texts, viewing art, etc. that leave us feeling ‘pulled up short’ (Gadamer, 
1975: 270). These experiences create an awareness of how our understanding is situated 
between the known and the unknown. In philosophical hermeneutics, the movements of 
being thrown beyond and affirming what one previously understood provide the basis for 
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(re-)forming notions of self and other. The task to be taken up is not one of covering up 
the tensions with being in-between the familiar and strange but bringing them out (see 
Gadamer, 1975: 305).
Beyond the overall descriptive parallels between philosophical hermeneutics and how 
I came to characterise my experiences as both affirming and disorientating, this tradition 
speaks to my learning because of the importance it places on how we encounter one 
another through the mix of the familiar and the strange. This is the topic I wish to take up 
in the remainder of this section.
Schwandt (1999) interprets Gadamer as outlining three ways one can respond to feel-
ing ‘pulled up short’. One is for others to become an object of study in order to make 
predictions about their behaviour and nature. In this way, the other is rendered tractable. 
A second way of responding is to superficially acknowledge the importance of others’ 
understandings, but then to impose one’s own interpretation on them all the same.
In contrast, Gadamer advocated that ‘understanding requires an openness to experi-
ence, a willingness to engage in a dialogue with that which challenges our self-under-
standing. To be in a dialogue requires that we listen to the other and simultaneously risk 
confusion and uncertainty both about ourselves and about the other person we seek to 
understand’ (Schwandt, 1999: 458). That risk stems from the need to find ways of ‘induc-
ing interpretative interactions that not only expose us to the unusual and unanticipated 
but which also place the assumptions of our customary horizons at risk’ (Davey, 2006: 
4). Arguably Gadamer’s thinking was not well developed though in elaborating what is 
needed to induce interpretative interactions such that they further openness and chal-
lenge (Kerdeman, 1998).
In engaging with Gadamer as a way into understanding the experiences recounted in 
previous sections, my attention turned toward considering how the self-other dialogues 
associated with magic can be conducted in ways that further openness and challenge. 
Taken in general, the manner in which attentiveness to others as well as the mix of affir-
mation/disorientation figure in conjuring makes it a ripe activity for reflecting on every-
day assumptions. Yet, again in general, as an activity magic strikes a troubled relation 
toward questioning. Deception is integral to magic and recognized as such by audiences. 
More than this though, the anticipation for audience scrutiny itself can be used reflex-
ively by performers to engage in forms of deception (Smith, 2015). For instance, con-
sider lines 7-9 in the transcription in the previous section. Under the pretense explaining 
something about magic to the participants, I was able to undertake a sleight based on 
spreading the cards. As such, dialogue takes place on fraught terms. Another reason for 
the troubled relation toward questioning in magic is that the interactions often involve 
stark asymmetries in who speaks, who directs and who acts.
In terms of my efforts, I can propose ways in which I ended up promoting questioning 
in line with the recommendations of philosophical hermeneutics. For instance, the basic 
focus group-inspired organisation of the performances examined in section 5 was 
intended to take engagement with audiences beyond the typical affective responses that 
follow acts of magic (e.g., displays of surprise, curiosity, incredulity). Also, as noted in 
the vignettes, my ongoing reflection was attentive to anomalous experiences and the dif-
ficulties of understanding others. Through this attention I was able to take my own 
assumptions as a topic for consideration.
12 Qualitative Research 00(0)
And yet, despite such affinities between the interpretative interactions suggested phil-
osophical hermeneutics and the magic sessions discussed in the previous section, the 
prior analysis suggested various areas of concern regarding my engagements vis-à-vis 
Gadamer’s call to further openness. For instance, the statements in the quote at the start 
of section 5 regarding being ‘mugged’ (lines 32–39) hint at the many fraught ethical and 
affective dimensions of trickery. This includes the potential for individuals to feel defen-
sive, duped, demeaned, etc. As well, the concerns previously articulated about the inde-
terminate relation between seeing and knowing beg questions about what ‘openness’ 
could or should mean.
Further reflections
Having come to this mixed assessment of the extent of openness and challenge as part of 
the activities recounted in section 5, I wish to close this section by reflecting on the 
analysis given so far. As a study into self-other relations, the preceding argument has 
highlighted the diverse range of alternatives available for and stakes associated with 
performing conjuring. Such attention, however, also could be directed at the alternatives 
and stakes of analysing conjuring that this article has undertaken. For instance, the previ-
ous argument has outlined some of the epistemic frustrations of repeatedly trying to 
discern the mental states and experiences of others. Are other orientations possible?
In this regard, it is worth noting that there are many other activities involving interac-
tional asymmetries in which those asymmetries have led to questions about how people 
can meet each other in ways that further, rather than reduce, dialogue. As part of this 
questioning, various scholars have delineated the qualities of our attention to each other. 
For instance, in the context of caring, Noddings (2013) juxtaposed projection and recep-
tion. Projection entails seeking to analyse and establish what another is experiencing. 
Reception, in contrast, entails a motivational shift. That shift calls for becoming engrossed 
with the other in order to attempt to feel for and become sensitive to their wants and 
needs – indeed to be transformed by them – even as it is recognised that it is not possible 
to straightforwardly access their reality. Noddings argued that reception is not about 
making another person into an object, because reception is not driven by a desire to make 
claims to knowledge. Instead, it is about receiving others. In making the case for the 
importance of reception in caring relations, Noddings did not seek to exclude other forms 
of attending. Analytical forms of projection to derive knowledge still have a place. ‘What 
seems to be crucial’ she argued ‘is that we retain the ability to move back and forth and 
to invest the appropriate mode’ (ibid.: 35).
In looking back on my efforts to undertake and analyse my learning, I can recognise 
how I have been highly indebted to forms of attending based on projection – that is, 
attempting to establish an account of experiences; this not least for the purpose of formu-
lating research findings. I repeatedly experienced the inability to do so as a kind of trou-
ble or failure. It need not have been so, though. Instead, it could have been taken as the 
basis for the appreciation of learning as a form of being together rather than knowing the 
other.
In this way, through its commitments, the previous argument both provides a testa-
ment to the learning undertaken and marks the limits of learning.
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Presenting conjuring
Through recounting a process of skills acquisition, this article has examined how learn-
ing can entail an inquiry into notions of self-other. In this final section, I want to conclude 
by comparing magic to other forms of competency learning.
A first set of conclusions relates to the place of seeing in social interactions. The 
mutual scaffolding between seeing and knowing has widely figured as a theme in the 
cultural and social analysis of skills acquisition. Roepstorff (2007), for instance, pre-
sented learning to navigate through glaciers and to read brain scans as hard won enskill-
ments wherein refined vision underpinned adept situated practice. For O’Conner (2005), 
sight functioned as a taken for granted means of receiving sensory inputs that enabled her 
and other glassblowers to gain nuanced types of focal and subsidiary awareness.
Learning in my case certainly entailed the refinement of visual motor skills (for 
instance, with regard to finger positioning) through assessing actions (spreading, cutting, 
placing, lifting, etc. cards) against specified and inferred instructional outcomes. 
However, what has also come to the fore is the complex and sometimes indeterminate 
relation between seeing and knowing. In the practices surveyed above, seeing could not 
straightforwardly be taken as knowing (e.g., knowing whether physical manipulations 
are detectable, knowing that someone is being truthful, knowing how reliably the visual 
effects of sleights can be repeated). Knowing, too, fostered a questioning of what takes 
place in seeing, for instance in relation to what was not made visible in instructional 
videos and the alluring seductions of gazing into a mirror when one knows what to look 
for. Further, determinations of whether seeing should be regarded as relevant, and how it 
is made so, were part and parcel of the situational constitution of interactions.
As such, definitions of learning that depict it as a process of error detection against 
expected outcomes (Argyris, 1995), or of relating stimulus to responses (Lachman, 
1997), or of disciplining errors to achieve greater skilfulness (Downey et al., 2015) cap-
ture only part of the dynamics surveyed in the previous sections. My learning entailed a 
maturing hesitancy about my claims to individual agency and control, even as I became 
defter in physically working cards and socially working with audiences.
As I have come to understand it then, the trick in learning magic is skilfully acting 
in-between certainty and uncertainty, as well as the possibilities for affirmation and not. 
In this way (invoking Tim Ingold’s (2001) adoption of James Gibson’s term), learning 
involved an ‘education of attention’. That is to say, it involved the sensitisation of the 
perceptual system. However, educating attention entailed unsettling the standing of see-
ing, not only refining it. This unsettling took place at two levels: one, making sense of 
specific sensory experiences (what I was seeing as part of an encounter – looking in a 
mirror, watching a video, etc.) and, two, making sense of the sensory capacities in gen-
eral (the possibilities for discernment given the fallibilities of perception). In this way, 
knowledge and ignorance were both mutually implicating and constitutive of the process 
of learning. As a result, I came to know, to realise I did not know, to wonder what I could 
know, and to doubt what I had thought I knew through my unfolding engagements. In 
this way too, magic as a method of inquiring did not just entail learning about self-other, 
but also appreciating the fraught conditions for learning.
Taking these points together with themes from previous sections, learning has entailed 
developing receptiveness to movement, that is, when to shift between (and set aside):
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– particular situated events and general descriptions;
– the reliance on others’ accounts and the questioning of them;
– the credence given to and the distancing from specific sensory experiences;
– the capacity for affirming and disaffirming sensory experiences;
– the desire to know the other and the possibility of alternative forms of engagement.
By way of closing, I end with some final reflections on another set of conclusions related 
to how this article adds to the understanding of self-other relations and in particular the 
relevance of intersubjectivity. Analysing the performance of magic as an ‘intersubjec-
tive’ accomplishment has not implied the presence of shared meaning. Nor has it sig-
nalled the completed transformation of ignorance into practical knowledge (Goodwin, 
1994: 614). Instead, intersubjectivity’s relevance comes in gesturing towards a belief in 
the potential for mutual understanding (Susswein and Racine, 2008), a possibility that 
matters to the extent it is worked towards rather than ultimately secured. In simulating 
the instructions in a book, copying movements in a video, or watching oneself in a mir-
ror, others were treated as ‘like subjects’. This expression though implies two different 
senses of the term like (Benjamin, 2004: 5): both that (i) I attempted to use analog rea-
soning to feel through others in order to establish how they sensed the world and (ii) I 
recognised others were distinct individuals and thus able to have dissimilar affective 
states and perceptions. Both aspects were critical.
But more than this, the reconsiderations of my experience prompted calling into ques-
tion my self-conceptions. In this regard, enskilling has not entailed an ever-expanding 
claim to physical and perceptual mastery, but rather a growing appreciation of the forms 
of our shared body limits and the many ways in which interpersonal interactions expose 
us to scrutiny by others. Gilson (2015) referred to such appreciations through the term 
‘intersubjective vulnerability’. She highlighted vulnerability as a fundamental condition 
of intersubjectivity, rather than it being a matter limited in relevancy to certain impaired, 
susceptible, or marginalised individuals. Through treating vulnerability in this manner, it 
is possible to recognise the importance of our being ‘open with others, to be shaped by 
[others], to become a self only through relation to them; it is the condition that makes it 
possible for us to become who we are and will make it possible for us to become other-
wise’ (ibid: 231). These are the kinds of considerations that have become central for me. 
To be sure, asymmetries in knowledge and action between magicians and audiences 
commonly constitute conjuring as an activity. And yet, magicians and audiences alike 
make themselves vulnerable as part of the mutual dependencies of social interaction.
In light of the preceding argument then, what response can be given the question 
‘What kind of work is required in learning magic?’ One answer is this: the cultivation of 
sensitivities for staying with and moving between varied orientations to our experiences 
with others. What follows is that attempts to analytically depict the process of learning, 
as in the case this article, can be evaluated, in part, through how the evidence and analy-
sis presented enables the recognition and cultivation of diverse appreciations of our 
encounters with one another.
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Notes
1. For a discussion of how magicians teach in light of the recognition of such differences, see 
Jones (2011).
2. For instance, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUrtygFXPDQ
3. For a detailed elaboration of that background, see https://brianrappert.net/magic/performances.
4. In six cases their non-academic partners. In sixteen of the sessions my academic wife (desig-
nated as ‘Emma’) attended.
5. In this case, the contention was made that it is possible to fail to see what is in one’s direct line 
of sight because of ‘perceptual blindness’.
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